Solution: Terrorism is a deviation, something out of the ordinary; there's no ordinariness about it like crime, epidemic, floods, or earthquake. It's a symptom of the disease, not the disease itself. A society or nation creates it, as studies on terrorism have revealed, through various unwise socio-political and economic decisions. Very similar to cholera or malaria, terrorism spreads through certain germs or bacteria; it just doesn't drop from the heavens. It's noteworthy, terrorist outfits representing minority communities often fizzle out - such as the IRA and LTTE - but those who are well-entrenched among the main stream of the population, remain formidable adversaries for years, if not decades. Global CT (Counter terrorism) operators have learnt that there are three different types of politically inspired violence: a) terrorism (b) insurgency and (c) insurgent-terrorism. The fine line between terrorism and insurgency often remains blurred. While al Qaeda is primarily terroristic, the ISIS champions global insurgencies against all governments across the world. Hence it's the most dangerous destabilizing force in the world. As terrorism is often part of broader insurgencies the terrorist JMB in Bangladesh is a surrogate to the global insurgency called ISIS - CT operators must apply counterinsurgency (COIN) methods as well. David Galula, the guru of COIN operators in the world (although this French expert came from the losing side of the War in Algeria), believes CT-COIN is "eighty percent political, and twenty percent military". CT-COIN operators in Bangladesh must apply the concerted civil, military, paramilitary, and political, economic, psychological forces to counter terrorism. Then again, CT-COIN operators mustn't follow security studies manuals, blindly. One military historian has pointed out, most CT- COIN operations have failed to achieve anything as the losing side has written "99 percent" of their manuals. Hence the desirability of innovation or creativity! Again civil-military cooperation is an essential pre- condition for the success of any CT-COIN operation, so goes General David Petraeus's Counterinsurgency Field Manual. The line between terrorists and insurgents is getting blurred, very fast. In countries where terrorists and insurgents come from the main stream of the populations, there's no guarantee about the success of any CT-COIN operations in those places. There's no alternative to addressing the socio-political, and economic issues to resolve the problem of terrorism-insurgency in those countries. We know terrorism isn't a law-and-order problem, and as such there's no quick fix or police and military solutions to the problem. However, this information is a bitter pill to swallow for most government agencies in Bangladesh, and elsewhere.